2. Quality here refers to concepts such as timeliness, specificity, and accuracy.
3. Cruise missiles exploit information age technologies to put a bomb on target. This is an example of information age warfare - using information age technologies as tools to better perform combat operations.
4. Direct manipulation changes the adversary's information while completely bypassing the adversary's perceptive, analytical, or decision processes,
5. There is troubling offense-defense asymmetry in the scope of information warfare. The military may, consistent with the law of armed conflict, attack any militarily significant target. In the context of information warfare, this means we may target any of the adversary's information functions that have a bearing on his will or capability to fight. In stark contrast, our military may defend only military information functions. There are many information functions critical to our national security that lie outside the military's defensive purview.
6. Note , this definition depends only on the nature of the action, not how it is accomplished.
7. To reiterate: Indirect Information Warfare: changing the adversary's information by creating a phenomena that the adversary must then observe and analyze. Electronic warfare, when used to degrade the adversary's ability to accurately perceive phenomena, is conducting indirect information warfare. Direct Information Warfare: changing the adversary's information without involving the intervening perceptive and analytical functions. Replacing bar code labels with bogus ones on pallets in a deployment staging area is a form of direct information warfare.
8. Note, this paper uses the JCS recognized label "electronic warfare" instead of "electronic combat".
9. Military deception provides an excellent example of how actions are defined by their ends, not means. Air power may conduct information warfare through military deception, as in World War II's Operation FORTITUDE NORTH, where the Allies dropped two bombs in the Pas de Calais for each bomb dropped in Normandy, a successful effort to mislead the Germans about our invasion plans.
10. Current security measures include OPSEC, COMSE, and COMPUSEC. As information technology changes, these security measures will almost certainly evolve into entirely different forms.
11. Examples: Cutting the radar to command center landline is information denial. Insider trading is information exploitation. Altering a barcode is information corruption. Reformatting someone's hard drive is information destruction.
12. Corruption covers the spectrum from subtle alteration to thorough destruction.
13. A SOF team dropping a powerful magnet on a hard disk is an example of information attack.
14. Military deception creates an alternate reality upon which the adversary will base his decisions; psychological operations target the will to fight; physical attack creates phenomena for the adversary to perceive and convert into information; OPSEC denies the enemy knowledge of our own operations.
15. OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. Observation converts phenomena into data. Orientation processes the data into information. Decide converts the information into orders. Act converts the orders into action. The OODA loop is continuous-as you act you observe the results, starting the process all over again.
16. realm, n: the region, sphere, or domain within which anything occurs, prevails. or dominates. [ The Random House College Dictionary]
17. Land, sea, air, and space are realms within which we may conduct military operations. Each realm imposes its characteristics on operations within it. Information and its functions also may host military operations, but those operations must conform to the characteristics of the information system and its functions.
18. Consider, for example, DESERT STORM, or Israel's domination of the air over the Bekaa Valley in 1982. Reaching further into the historical record, in the initial stages of General Allenby's 1918 Palestine Campaign, Allied aircraft attacked key Turkish telephone exchanges, destroying communications among Turkish forces. Consequently, the Fourth Army remained in bivouac for four days, unaware of the disaster befalling other Turkish forces to their west.